I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty years before the end of Major League Baseball's comprehensive reserve clause, which assigned to team owners the exclusive right to market player contracts, Simon Rottenberg (1956, p. 255) observed that ''a market in which freedom is limited by the reserve rule such as that which governs the baseball labor market distributes players among teams about as a free market would.'' The subsequent economics literature has been divided regarding whether the distribution of players under the reserve clause and free agency is not just identical but also efficient. My analysis suggests that it is not.
The typical popular view is that competitive balance is achieved when teams, at least over time, perform equally well as measured by winning percentage or championship frequency. Economic analysis suggests instead that if team revenues uniformly reflect fan satisfaction, then competitive balance is optimal when talent is allocated so as to maximize revenues for the league as a whole. The two notions of competitive balance match only when team markets are of equal size, either by coincidence or because of freedom of entry and relocation of team franchises. Under the prevailing circumstances in which market sizes differ, superior on-field performance by large-market teams does not in itself indicate to economists that the existing level of competitive balance is suboptimal. The question of interest is whether the dominance of large-market teams is excessive, thereby reducing total league revenues.
The next section reviews the debate about the efficiency consequences that result from the external effects that teams impose on each other through their competition for athletic talent. The following sections then establish three key points. Section III shows that teams generally fail to achieve the league revenuemaximizing allocation of talent when the teams acquire players from an external market with a perfectly elastic supply of playing skills. Section IV turns to the internal marketing of athletic talent, for which Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) have demonstrated that decentralized franchises reach the same allocation of playing skills as a league revenue-maximizing monopolist as long as internally marketed skills sell for a uniform price. However, the analysis of section IV indicates that the arbitrage process that drives the internal marketing of talent does not lead to a uniform price for playing skills but only to an equilibrium set of bilateral transaction prices between each pair of teams. As a result, decentralized franchises do not end up with an equal marginal revenue product of playing skills across teams and therefore do not achieve the allocation of talent that a league revenue-maximizing monopolist would choose. Section V examines the nature of the discrepancy between the optimal allocation of talent and the allocation achieved by noncooperative franchises. Linking fan interest to the championship prospects of the fan's preferred team generates an outcome in which unrestricted competition for playing skills by decentralized franchises results in excessive domination by large-market teams whose incremental acquisitions of playing skills impose negative externalities on third-party rivals. Appropriate per unit taxes and/or subsidies on playing skills can be structured as a firstbest policy to address this inefficiency.
II. THE EXTERNALITIES DEBATE
In ''The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sports,' ' Neale (1964) described the distinctive mix of cooperation and competition that characterizes sports markets. With respect to the externalities that teams impose on each other in their competition for athletic talent, not only are the externalities themselves peculiar, so is the economic debate concerning them. For decades, opposing opinions have entered the literature on parallel tracks regarding whether market forces ensure that athletic talent gets efficiently allocated across the teams of a sports league. Closure has remained elusive, despite considerable and continuing research into the closely related issue of competitive balance. As noted by Zimbalist (2002, p. 111) in an issue of the Journal of Sports Economics devoted to the topic of competitive balance: ''Competitive balance is like wealth. Everyone agrees it is a good thing to have, but no one knows how much one needs.'' Lack of closure regarding the fundamental debate impedes the ability of economists to weigh in forcefully on policies ostensibly addressed to competitive balance objectives. Demmert (1973) articulated the underlying concern that the allocation of athletic talent within a league would likely be distorted by a failure of teams to internalize the inherent external effects that arise from the competition to field successful teams:
The improvement of a better than average team results in diseconomies which are external to the club in question but internal to the league. Likewise, the improvement of a poor team results in benefits to the league as a whole over and above those which accrue to that individual club. It cannot be expected that the club will consider these external effects of its decisions in determining the level of its team 's quality. (p. 29) After modeling the situation to arrive at an illustrative competitive equilibrium, Demmert concluded that ''the jointly optimal distribution of athletic talent among league members will, in general, differ from . . . the vector of optimal level team quality '' (1973, p. 46) . Daly and Moore (1981) echoed Demmert's concerns. They first summarized Rottenberg's argument that ''if both owners and players are wealth maxzimizers (an assumption universal in this literature) the Coase theorem assures us that the ownership of property rights should not alter the allocation [of] resources '' (1981, p. 78) . They then concluded that the competitive equilibrium under either the reserve clause or free agency would be inefficient under the related assumptions that (a) external effects are an inherent and important aspect of the production process in the team sports industry and (b) transactions costs associated with internalizing these effects are of such a magnitude that such internalization does not, in fact, occur. . . . The second assumption . . . implies that sports leagues will systematically produce competitions which are less equal than that required by considerations of joint wealth maximization of team owners. (p. 79-80).
In stark contrast, considerable research reflects the view that competing teams do achieve an efficient allocation of playing skills. Hunt and Lewis (1974, p. 940) proposed an unassailable scenario in which in the absence of any other sources of player income, the amount that the dominating team must offer for the player resources necessary to increase dominance is equal to the loss in revenue that the other teams would experience due to the resource transfer. Unless the dominating team offers more than this amount, other teams would meet its bids and retain the services of the player resources. . . . The profit-maximizing amount of dominance, where marginal revenue equals marginal cost for the dominant team . . . by definition also maximizes division revenue since all marginal costs are lost revenues.
Note, though, that this scenario rests on a thoroughgoing application of the Coase theorem in a negligible transaction cost environment. It presumes, for example, that if league revenues are maximized with all-star pitcher Mike Mussina on the Baltimore Orioles, then when the New York Yankees attempt to bid Mussina away, all of the adversely affected teams can pool their bids to keep Mussina in place. It therefore leaves open the question of whether the same outcome could occur without such extensive cooperation. Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) and Fort and Quirk (1995) have formally modeled sports leagues in which decentralized and noncooperative franchises compete for athletic talent and have concluded that the resulting allocation of playing skills is efficient. Quirk and El Hodiri (1974) examined the allocation of a stock of playing skills that is fixed at any given point in time and concluded that when teams face the ''same price per unit of existing skills'' (p. 35), if the league were operated as a syndicate rather than under a decentralized system, then for any level of wage and bonus costs the syndicate would allocate players among teams so as to maximize the discounted present value of revenue for the league. But this implies that marginal revenues are equal for all teams; hence the distribution that would emerge under syndicated control of the league is the same as the equilibrium that exists under decentralized management of franchises (p. 40).
1 Fort and Quirk (1995) relaxed the assumption of a fixed stock of playing skills and modeled a league situation ''absent any restrictions on the amount of talent hired by a team'' (p. 1272), in which teams acquire playing skills at a constant ''per-unit price of talent determined in the labor market'' (p. 1271). They again concluded that competitive markets yield efficient results as long as the league follows specified optimizing guidelines: ''The rational choice for a league as a whole is to have the same rules for gate sharing and local TV revenue sharing. This will lead to a distribution of playing strengths that maximizes leaguewide revenues in the absence of a salary cap' ' (p. 1288) .
Recent comments in the professional literature illustrate the absence of closure to date. Zimbalist (2002) has summarized the economics literature's prevailing view regarding the efficient outcome achieved by profit-maximizing teams:
Economic theory tells us that the optimal level of balance in a sports league is a function of the distribution of fan preferences, fan population base, and fan income across host cities. Profit maximizing teams will accumulate units of talent until the marginal revenue per win is equalized across all teams. This implies that in leagues with a fixed supply of teams (and monopoly or duopoly team rights to a territory), the league will maximize revenues when teams from large, rich and fan-intense cities win more often. (p. 11) Nearly as recently, Rosen and Sanderson (2001) have left room for doubt: ''Given the concerns that are often voiced about balance issues, some current arrangements might well be inefficient. . . . Until some progress is made on more thoroughly understanding the larger decentralization problem, it is difficult to analyse these arrangements'' (p. F66). Ultimately, of course, both sides can't be right. Unrestricted and noncooperative competition for athletic talent by decentralized team owners either leads to an efficient, league revenuemaximizing allocation of playing skills across teams, or it does not. The following analysis suggests that it does not.
III. INTERNAL VERSUS EXTERNAL SKILL TRANSACTIONS
Consider a sports league in which teams generate revenue (R) through gate receipts and broadcast revenues that correspond to a common proportion of fan willingness-topay for team success. Each team's revenue rises with team performance, but at a strictly diminishing rate. A profit-maximizing league monopolist would acquire incremental talent only as long as the additional revenue generated for the league as a whole exceeds the additional cost incurred and would allocate the resulting stock of playing skills across teams so as to maximize league revenue. The resulting allocation would equalize the marginal revenue product of playing skills across teams, and it would constitute an efficient allocation in the sense of maximizing total fan willingness-to-pay. So the allocation of playing skills chosen by a league monopolist establishes the comparative benchmark for allocations arrived at under alternative league structures. Now suppose instead that the teams of the league operate under separate noncooperative ownership. Each team retains all of its home market revenues. Players receive irrevocable season-long contracts. Following Demmert (1973 , p. 41), El Hodiri and Quirk (1971 , p. 1308 , and Hunt and Lewis (1976, 1. El Hodiri and Quirk (1971) did express concerns about the allocation of playing skills in the original presentation of their model: ''Because of the externalities inherent in professional sports, profit maximization does not necessarily lead to desirable, much less optimal, results even from the point of view of the owners of the teams'' (p. 1315).
p. 940), each team pursues playing skills under a Cournot assumption that the stock of rival talent is fixed, other than changes that result from market decisions that involve the team itself.
As shown in Canes (1974) and reiterated by Rosen and Sanderson (2001) , if the competing teams have access to incremental external talent, then because each team considers only its own revenue rather than the value of incremental talent to the league as a whole, the aggregate level of league talent tends to become inefficiently high as teams engage in an arms (and bats) race. The additional point established here is that the aggregate talent will also be inefficiently allocated unless teams supplement their external acquisitions with internal transfers of players. Specifically, if each team relies exclusively on external hiring, equating the marginal revenue product of talent to a uniform going market price for talent, the equilibrium allocation of playing skills will differ from the allocation that a revenuemaximizing league monopolist would choose or which teams would arrive at through the internal marketing of talent.
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A two-team league can serve to illustrate the alternative allocations. For now assume that fans measure the success of a team by its expected winning percentage (W), which depends on the team's relative stock of playing skills (S). So, for a baseball league consisting of a large-market team, the Chicago Cubs (c), and a small-market team, the Milwaukee Brewers (b), the revenue functions are
where
A i is a scalar that distinguishes between market size (A c > A b ), and f(h ij ) is a function that relates the proportion of games won by team i against team j to the share of the two teams' combined stock of playing skills that team i possesses.
The function f(h ij ) exhibits the behavior common to cumulative probability distributions: f(0) equals zero, f(1) equals one, and the rate of increase of f(h ij ) is symmetric around the midpoint value where h ij equals 0.5. The intuition behind the symmetry restriction is that the marginal product of any increase in the relative skill share of team i in generating a higher proportion of games won must be mirrored by the marginal product of the corresponding decrease in the relative skill share of team j. Under the most plausible pattern the marginal product of an increased share of playing skills would be nondecreasing for h ij less than 0.5 and nonincreasing for h ij greater than 0.5. In the simplest specification, which is also the most common in the economics literature, the proportion of games won by team i equals h ij itself, in which case the marginal product of the relative share of playing skills is constant, and marginal revenue product therefore declines only because of fans' diminishing marginal willingness-topay for improved team performance.
Consider first the marginal revenue product of a playing skill unit transferred internally to the Cubs from the Brewers (MRPn cb ):
Because (S c þ S b )/100 constitutes 1% of the total stock of playing skills, the marginal revenue product of a transfer of 1% of total playing skills to the Cubs from the Brewers (MRP%n cb ) reduces to
For a two-team league, the winning-percentage effects of a change in relative skill levels between the two teams (df/dh ij ) necessarily offset each other, so it is equivalent to compare either the marginal revenue from improved performance across teams, as in Quirk and Fort (1992, p. 272 ) and Fort and Quirk 2. Recent research has broached some aspects of this issue. Marburger (2002) observed that a team places a higher value on talent acquired from within the team's own conference rather than from a nonrival conference, but he did not expect the equilibrium allocation of talent to be affected. Vrooman (1995 Vrooman ( , 2000 , using a model of a two-team league, concluded that teams could arrive at a nonrevenue-maximizing equilibrium but attributed the cause to diminishing productivity of talent rather than the distinction between external and internal talent.
(1995) or the marginal revenue product across teams, as in Whitney (1988 Whitney ( , 1993 and Marburger (2002) . If the two teams possess a fixed stock of total talent that can be freely marketed between them, they will find it profitable to transfer skills until they equate their marginal revenue product (and their marginal revenue), and they will therefore achieve the same allocation of talent as a revenue-maximizing league monopolist. This is the common result in the sports literature. Now consider instead the outcome if the teams do not engage in internal transactions but have access to a perfectly elastic supply of external playing skills at price Ps. The marginal revenue product of a playing skill unit acquired externally by either team (MRPx i , i ¼ c,b) is given by
So the marginal revenue product to team i of an external acquisition of talent amounting to 1% of total playing skills (MRP%x i ) is
Comparing (4) and (6), notice that for any given positive level of relative skill share, the marginal revenue product of externally acquired talent is lower than the marginal revenue product of internally acquired talent. Internally acquired talent always gives a team an extra boost by weakening the rival team that gives up the talent. More important, notice that the allocation that equates the marginal revenue product of internally marketed playing skills will not equate the marginal revenue product of externally acquired skills unless S i equals S j -in other words, unless competition is perfectly balanced-at the internal transactions equilibrium, Sn*. If skill shares are not equal, then the marginal revenue product of externally acquired playing skills will be lower at the internal transactions equilibrium for the stronger of the two teams, because at the internal transactions equilibrium (dR i /dW i Á df/dh ij ) is the same for both teams, but (S j /[S i þ S j ]) is lower for the stronger team. So restricting transactions to the external market for talent induces the teams to shift toward a more even distribution of playing skills, and the teams reach an external transactions equilibrium when the marginal revenue product (MRP) of externally acquired skills converges for the two teams. In the reallocation process, the teams shift away from the league's revenue-maximizing optimum. Figure 1 provides an example to contrast the two alternative sets of MRP curves and playing skill allocations in the simple case in which winning percentage is assumed to be directly proportional to relative skill share (
The horizontal axis plots the share of employed talent from the left-hand origin for the large-market Cubs and from the right-hand origin for the small-market Brewers. The vertical axis measures the value and cost of a 1% unit of total league playing skills. The solid lines constitute the MRP curves for playing skills transferred between the two teams. With winning percentage strictly proportional to skill share, the marginal physical product of a percentage point of playing skills is constant, so the downward slope of each team's MRP is due entirely to diminishing fan willingness-to-pay for improved team performance. If the league permits internal marketing of talent, the two teams can reach the revenue-maximizing equilibrium at point a in Figure 1 , where the Cubs acquire just over 67% of the league's total playing skills.
The lower dotted-line curves in Figure 1 correspond to each team's MRP for externally acquired playing skills. The two MRP curves for internally and externally acquired skills have the same vertical intercept since, at the outset, when team i has no talent, S j /(S i þ S j ) in equation (6) equals one, and internally and externally acquired talent are equally productive. But S j /(S i þ S j ) falls continuously as team i's share of league talent rises, pushing each team's MRP%x progressively further below its MRP%n in Figure 1 as the team's relative playing strength increases. The basic intuition is that the external acquisition of playing skills does not transfer a rival's talent but only dilutes it, and the effectiveness of diluting talent as a substitute for a direct transfer decreases as the rival's share of league talent falls. If the two teams can acquire only external playing skills, then the Nash equilibrium occurs at point b in Figure 1 , where the Cubs possess 60% of the league's total talent. The discrepancy between allocations arrived at through external and internal talent acquisitions generalizes to an m-team league. Assuming that teams play an equal number of games againsteach other during a season, the marginal revenue product of talent acquired by team i from team j (MRPn ij ) is given by
which is strictly greater than
for any positive S i . So external contracting, even under perfectly elastic supply conditions as in Fort and Quirk (1995) , does not constitute an equivalent substitute for the internal marketing of a fixed stock of athletic talentand does not generate the allocation of talent that a revenuemaximizing league monopolist would choose.
IV. THE MARKETING AND PRICING OF INTERNAL SKILLS
The professional sports league model specified by El Hodiri and Quirk (1971) and Quirk
FIGURE 1
Reciprocal Demand for Playing Skills: Internal versus External Transactions 3. Notice that the marketing environment has a significant impact on the equilibrium levels of playing-skill employment and expenditures. Consider three alternative scenarios for opening the league to internal transactions: (1) Teams own the marketing rights to player contracts, face a perfectly elastic supply of external playing skills, and operate without roster or payroll limits: The smallmarket Brewers replace the talent they sell to the Cubs until the unit cost of a percentage increase in playing skills acquired externally rises to the MRPx faced by the Brewers at the revenue-maximizing allocation (Sn*). MRPx is lower for the Cubs than for the Brewers at Sn*, so the Cubs experience buyer's remorse and are constrained by the irrevocable contracts offered to players. (2) Teams own the marketing rights to player contracts, but restrictions such as league salary caps, roster limits, and/or a perfectly inelastic supply of playing skills hold salary expenditures at or below the MRPx faced by the Cubs at Sn*. This arrangement relieves difficulties associated with buyer's remorse, but enforcement issues arise instead because the Brewers would like to acquire extra external talent at Sn*. (3) Players are free agents who own the internal marketing rights to their contracts. The equilibrium cost of each 1% share of playing skills rises to MRPn at Sn*. Players become the beneficiaries of natural and artificial restrictions on the aggregate level of league talent.
and El Hodiri (1974) remains the most comprehensive to date, and it has generated a number of useful results. The only result at issue here is the claim by Quirk and El Hodiri (1974, p. 40 ) that ''syndicated control of the league'' and ''decentralized management of franchises'' generate the same relative distribution of athletic talent among the teams of the league.
Quirk and El Hodiri's result depends on a key assumption about the pricing of internally marketed skills. Initially, El Hodiri and Quirk (1971 Quirk ( , p. 1307 assumed that ''for any one team, the price paid for existing players is the same wherever acquired.'' They strengthened the assumption to a universally uniform price in Quirk and El Hodiri (1974, p. 35) : ''It is assumed that franchise owners take as given . . . the price per unit of existing skills. . . . Furthermore, arbitrage operations are assumed to ensure that each team pays . . . the same price per unit of existing skills.'' Under this assumption, teams achieve a profit-maximizing equilibrium that equates their marginal revenue product of internally marketed playing skills to a common value consisting of the external price per unit of playing skills plus the internal sale price of player contracts between teams. The value of incremental talent is therefore equalized across teams, just as it would be for a league monopolist. A league monopolist differs from decentralized franchises by recognizing that the impact on total league revenues of additional talent acquired by any given team equals zero. Although decentralized franchises overvalue talent, they do not misallocate it.
However, arbitrage can only be counted on to exhaust all profitable talent transactions between teams, not necessarily to equalize the unit price of those transactions. Internal contract sales occur between specifically identifiable teams, and the transaction value unavoidably depends on the teams involved. Consider, for example, the ''curse of the Bambino,'' according to which the sale of Babe Ruth from the Boston Red Sox to the New York Yankees reversed (for 86 years) the dominance of the two teams. In general, a pennant contender benefits more by acquiring a given star from its closest rival than from a last-place team. With uniform sale prices replaced by transaction-specific prices, teams fail to achieve the allocation of talent that would equalize the marginal revenue product of playing skills across teams and thereby match the allocation chosen by a league monopolist.
Formally, consider now a league that allocates a fixed stock of playing skills. The aggregate stock of skills is sufficiently small that at the league equilibrium all teams value marginal talent more highly than its external market price, Ps. Each team i begins with an endowment of playing skills, So i , and can then alter the talent it uses through interteam marketing of skills. Let q ij denote the quantity of playing skills acquired by team i from team j; q ij less than zero signifies that team i is a net seller of playing skills to team j. Sequential transactions (t) occur at transaction-specific prices, Pq ij,t , negotiated between teams. Retaining the prior assumption of Cournot behavior, the goal of each team i is to choose its profit-maximizing set of inter-team skill transactions:
where T ij denotes the last in the series of transactions between teams i and j, Team i maximizes its profits by satisfying m ÿ 1 first-order conditions, one for each rival team j:
The marginal contract price, Pq ij,Tij , equals the quasi-rent that team j receives by utilizing the final transacted skill unit itself instead of selling it to team i,
So bilateral transactions between teams equate each team pair-specific MRP of internally marketed playing skills. But only for the special case of a Nash equilibrium with evenly balanced competition will the marginal transaction prices and therefore all of the bilateral marginal revenue products end up at the same value for all team pairs. Table 1 provides an example of a four-team league with different-sized markets, again under the simple assumption that W ij ¼ 100 Á S i / (S i þ S j ). 4 The top panel illustrates the outcome discussed in section III in which teams acquire all of their talent externally and equate their MRP of externally acquired skills. For each of the four teams, column 2 reports the team's share of league playing skills (Skills%), column 3 its winning percentage (W%), and column 4 its total revenue (TR) based on the total revenue functions given at the bottom of the table. The common value of MRP%x, 1.002, appears in column 5 of the top panel. Columns 6-9 record the buyer (b) and seller (s) MRPs for talent marketed between each pair of teams, MRP%n ij , and the spread between the two values, for each of the possible bilateral transactions between teams, given the skill levels listed in column 2. Notice that all of the MRPs for internal transactions exceed MRP%x, illustrating the greater benefits that teams receive when they acquire talent from their rivals than from outside the league. Moreover, consistent with the results of section III, the initial endowments leave the teams with numerous opportunities to raise revenues through internal transactions, as evidenced by the sizable positive spreads between many of the internal-transaction MRP values.
The lower panel of Table 1 illustrates the outcome of a hypothetical process in which teams sequentially execute progressively less profitable bilateral transactions for progressively smaller skill increments until the teams exhaust their opportunities to further boost revenues. Note the contrast between the panels: The MRPs of externally acquired skills are no longer equal across teams, and all of the spreads between the internal-transaction marginal revenue products have declined to nonmaterial levels. As in section III, competition becomes less balanced as the league shifts from an equilibrium reached through external transactions to its equilibrium following mutually advantageous internal transactions: The winning percentage of the largest-market team rises from 57.8% to 60.5%, and the winning percentage of the smallest-market team falls from 41.2% to 37.7%.
The last column of the lower part of Table 1 reports the impact on total league revenue of a 1% increase in talent by each respective team. Under the allocation chosen by a league monopolist, the values in column 10 would all be approximately zero, but the decentralized franchises considered here have failed to achieve that outcome. The teams have not internalized the relevant external effects of their bilateral transactions, and the resulting equilibrium is suboptimal.
V. FAN INTEREST AND EXCESSIVE DOMINANCE
The widespread popular complaint about competitive balance is that large-market dominance is excessively high. But notice that the example illustrated in Table 1 suggests just the opposite: The league-revenue effects of incremental talent reported in column 10 are actually positively related to team playing strength-to increase league revenues, a league monopolist would allocate talent so as to further reduce competitive balance beyond the reduction which decentralized franchises achieved in moving from external to internal skill transactions.
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The gains from additional dominance arise because, in this example, shifting talent from weak to strong teams generates external benefits rather than external costs for the other teams in the league. This impact links in turn to the assumption so far that fan interest is motivated by the winning percentage of the fan's preferred team, given by:
4. The chosen parameters generate a distribution of total revenues that approximates the observed distribution for professional baseball in the latter half of the 1990s. Based on data reported by Major League Baseball's Blue Ribbon Panel (Levin et al. 2000) , from 1995 to 1999, the average local revenues received by baseball's two highestearning and two lowest-earning teams in each of its six divisions, expressed as a proportion of the lowest-earning team, amounted to 3.5, 2.8, 1.5, and 1.0. 5. For example, for the market parameters adopted in Table 1 , the reallocation of talent from the internal transaction equilibrium reported in the lower panel to a league revenue-maximizing optimum (not reported in the table) raises the winning percentage of team 1 from 60.5% to 66.0% and lowers the winning percentage of team 4 from 37.7% to 30.1%. 
and the transfer therefore has a negative impact on the winning percentage of team i if and only if
If team j is stronger than team k, then the right-hand side of equation (14) is greater than one, so a necessary condition for a competitive balance-reducing skill transfer to impose external costs on a third-party team is that the left-hand side of equation (14) must likewise exceed one.
If f(h ij ) equals S i /(S i þ S j ) itself, as in the example illustrated in Table 1 , then the necessary condition fails to hold because marginal product is constant, and the left-hand side of (14) equals one instead of exceeding one. So under the most common specification in the economics literature, in which fan interest depends on winning percentage, and winning percentage is directly proportional to relative skill share, talent migration from weaker to stronger teams unambiguously raises rather than lowers the winning percentages of third-party teams. The third-party teams gain more from improved performance against the weaker of the two teams than they lose from worse performance against the stronger team.
In general, equation (14) implies that when a team acquires talent from a weaker rival, the winning percentage of a third-party team can fall only if the third-party team's marginal product of relative skill shares is greater at its level of competitiveness against the stronger rival who gains the talent than at its level of competitiveness against the weaker rival who loses it. But given the symmetry requirement for the overall winning percentage function, this in turn requires a specification that has not been pursued in the economics literature: There must be increasing returns to higher skill levels until reaching the midpoint skill share of 50%. Even in a more intuitively appealing case in which fans care about the outcome of individual games rather than winning percentage on average, positive externalities still routinely arise as a dominant team siphons off talent from the more proximate rivals of a third-party team.
By contrast, negative externalities from increased dominance readily occur under what Fort and Quirk (1995) refer to as the ''championship model,'' in which fan interest depends on the championship prospects of the fan's preferred team rather than the team's winning percentage per se. As noted in Whitney (1988, p. 721) , there is no closed form solution to a team's profit-maximization problem when its revenue depends on the probability that the team will win its league championship. However, both asymptotic behavior and short-season simulations readily generate negative impacts on the championship prospects of third-party teams when playing skills migrate from weaker to stronger rivals. Asymptotically, a transfer of talent that makes any particular team stronger than its rivals necessarily raises its championship probability at the expense of all other teams in the league as the number of games played between teams increases and thereby reduces the role of chance in determining a championship outcome. Likewise, with as few as three games between each pair of teams in a fourteam league, a 1% transfer of league skills from any weaker to a stronger team decreases the championship prospects of both thirdparty teams as long as the weakest team in the league has a championship probability of slightly under 1.25% or higher, and the threshold drops to under 0.5% when the league's rival pairs play five games against each other. Table 2 illustrates a short-season simulation in which four teams play each other five times apiece over the course of a 15-game season. 6 As before, bilateral winning percentages are directly proportional to relative skill shares. Column 4 reports the revised determinant 6. As discussed in Whitney (1993) , diminishing marginal product of talent with respect to championship probability sets in with a very pronounced lag when teams play a multigame season. To ''front-load'' revenues and generate MRP curves that are well behaved in the economically relevant region under these circumstances, the illustration in Table 2 uses a constant-elasticity revenue function with an elasticity value of 0.2, which is in the neighborhood of the empirical estimate of 0.168 from Whitney (1993, p. 112) . Repeating the sequence followed in Table 1,  the top panel of Table 2 illustrates the case in which the four teams possess talent levels that equate their marginal revenue product of externally acquired playing skills. The middle part illustrates the Nash equilibrium that exhausts mutually advantageous bilateral arbitrage possibilities between team pairs. Notice the contrast between the pattern of values in the last column of the middle of Table 2 versus Table 1 . At the Nash equilibrium under competition for talent by decentralized franchises, when championship prospects matter to fans, the incremental value of talent to the league as a whole is negatively related to team dominance-league revenues can be increased by shifting talent from strong teams to weak teams. The bottom panel of Table 2 reports the allocation of talent that maximizes league revenue. The championship probability falls from 44.2% to 39.7% for team 1 and rises from 8.0% to 12.6% for team 4. The impact is especially pronounced for team 4, as its championship frequency rises from once every 12.6 years to once every 7.9 years. Figure 2 focuses on teams 1 and 4 to illustrate the contrast between the skill allocation arrived at under decentralized competition versus a league monopoly. The Figure traces out the two team MRP curves as they divide up the slightly over 50% of total league skills allocated to them under league revenue maximization while holding constant the skill levels of teams 2 and 3. The impact on the two third-party teams is factored in by adding a ''league MRP, excluding team 4'' curve to Figure 2 . The vertical gap between the league and team 1 MRP curves reflects the external effects (on teams 2 and 3) of each progressive skill unit transferred from team 4 to team 1.
Notice in Figure 2 that the external effects of skill reallocations from team 4 to team 1 are positive until team 1 becomes stronger than team 4, and the effects then turn negative. The two teams can gain from private bilateral skill transfers until they reach point C in Figure 2 , which results in excessive dominance by team 1. As in conventional externality analysis, the league can discourage excessive dominance by imposing a tax on skill acquisitions by team 1 from team 4 equal to the size of the gap between the league MRP and team 1 MRP at the league revenue-maximizing allocation. In Figure 2 , this policy is labeled as the optimal tax at point M and illustrates a tax rate of ; 30% on incremental skill acquired by team 1 from team 4. The analysis in this article suggests that the competition for athletic talent by decentralized sports franchises results in uninternalized external effects in general and inefficiently excessive competitive imbalance in particular. A number of related empirical and policy issues derive from this result. The case illustrated in Table 2 , for example, depicts sizable distributional effects across team markets but a negligible overall league revenue effect. The empirical mix could be quite different. Cross-market distributional effects could in themselves play an important role in policy debates despite the inclination of economists to focus instead on aggregate welfare effects.
The particular issues of competitive balance that emerge herecall for specific types of policies as well. Figure 2 illustrates how a conventional Pigouvian tax can promote the efficient pricing of the external costs associated with excessive dominance. Alternatively, a league could link a similarly sized Pigouvian subsidy to skill acquisitions by weaker franchises or adopt a revenue-neutral tax/subsidy scheme with an equivalent combined marginal impact. The recent practice in Major League Baseball of using luxury tax proceeds to provide revenue subsidies for low-revenue teams does not constitute a comparable first-best approach to the excessive dominance problem covered here because the revenue subsidies essentially reward teams for the low revenues they earn instead of encouraging them to acquire additional talent. 7 Empirical results and policy recommendations will likely continue to divide economists examining the external effects related to the allocation of athletic talent in professional team sports. But if economists can achieve common ground regarding the allocative consequences of these effects, the profession may be able to speak with a more consistent and persuasive voice in the popular debate about the desirable level of competitive balance and how best to achieve that balance.
